NJ’s nuclear power task farce: A corporate giveaway disguised as energy policy

The state is pushing ahead with costly new reactors without adequately examining alternatives, financial risks, or the potential burden on ratepayers.

New Jersey’s Nuclear Power Task Force is supposed to help shape the future of our energy system. But this is not an independent investigation into whether new nuclear reactors are safe, affordable, or necessary. It is a government-organized sales team for a nuclear expansion that politicians have already decided to pursue.

Instead of asking whether New Jersey should build new reactors, the task force is figuring out how to get them built, finance them, streamline permitting, and persuade the public to accept them. That’s government by public relations, not public policy.

On April 8, Gov. Mikie Sherrill’s administration moved to lift New Jersey’s roughly 50-year de facto moratorium on new nuclear construction. On July 13, Sherrill signed the Power NJ Act, establishing a procurement process for at least 1,100 megawatts of new nuclear generation. The law directs the Board of Public Utilities (BPU) and the New Jersey Economic Development Authority (NJEDA) to evaluate proposals and negotiate project terms. At its first meeting Oct. 1, the task force established five subcommittees covering permitting, financing, technology and supply chains, workforce development, and public engagement.

New Jersey is preparing to build a new nuclear industry before answering the most basic questions about whether it should. Where is the independent study demonstrating that new reactors are the best way to lower electricity bills? Where is the comprehensive comparison with solar, wind, battery storage, energy efficiency, demand management, and grid modernization? Where is the analysis showing that the benefits outweigh the financial, environmental, waste, and safety risks?

The state has announced its destination before honestly examining the alternatives. It is putting the cart before the reactor, and asking ratepayers to pick up the tab.

A task farce designed to produce a predetermined answer

The composition of the task force tells us a great deal about its purpose. It is co-chaired by Elizabeth Noll, the governor’s senior energy strategist, and Ben Hertz-Shargel, president of the BPU. Its members include Department of Environmental Protection Commissioner Ed Potosnak, NJEDA CEO Evan Weiss, PSEG Nuclear President and Chief Nuclear Officer Charles McFeaters, and Patrick O’Brien, Holtec International’s director of government affairs and communications.

Michele Siekerka, president and CEO of the New Jersey Business and Industry Association (NJBIA), also sits on the task force. PSEG is an NJBIA member and sits on its board, while Holtec is a member and has received an NJBIA award. The task force also includes labor representatives and Matthew McKinzie of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), which has supported nuclear power as part of the energy mix, including for meeting data center demand.

There is nothing inherently wrong with government consulting utilities, nuclear developers, business groups, labor, or environmental organizations. The problem is that this task force is charged with advancing nuclear power, includes industry representatives who could benefit from that expansion, and lacks a meaningful balance of independent voices prepared to challenge the premise.

The administration has put its own senior officials in charge of a body that will help develop the financing, regulatory, and permitting framework. Companies with a direct commercial interest in the outcome have seats at the table, and the agencies responsible for implementing the program are helping design it.

They are not independent referees. They are cheerleaders on the playing field.

The task force’s mandate is to facilitate the planning and advancement of new nuclear generation. Its subcommittees will work through the regulatory, financial, technical, and public-engagement issues involved in deploying reactors. Those functions may be necessary if the state ultimately decides to proceed, but implementation planning is no substitute for independently deciding whether the projects should proceed in the first place.

This is like asking a contractor to independently inspect a building the contractor has already been hired to construct. Five subcommittees do not create independence, and adding a public-engagement committee does not make a predetermined policy democratic.

The presence of an environmental organization that supports nuclear power does not transform a government-led nuclear development initiative into an independent scientific review. The NRDC has expertise and a legitimate role in energy debates, but it cannot represent the full range of environmental, consumer, public-health and community concerns.

The public needs independent energy economists, consumer advocates, nuclear safety specialists, public-health experts, climate scientists, and environmental organizations with differing views. They must have a meaningful opportunity to challenge assumptions, examine alternatives and recommend against nuclear expansion if the evidence does not support it.

An independent review must be allowed to reach an inconvenient conclusion. Otherwise, it is not independent.

The revolving door: Appearance matters

New Jersey’s energy policy also raises legitimate questions about the revolving door between government, consulting firms, utilities, developers and political advisers.

These relationships do not automatically establish wrongdoing, improper influence or a legal conflict of interest. People with industry experience can bring valuable expertise to public service. But when officials move between private energy businesses and the agencies overseeing those industries, transparency and safeguards are essential, especially when billions of dollars are at stake.

Before his nomination to lead the BPU, Hertz-Shargel was global head of grid edge at Wood Mackenzie, an energy research and consulting firm. According to the governor’s June 2026 announcement, his work involved advising energy, technology and financial firms on grid modernization, electrification, distributed energy resources, emerging energy technologies and data centers.

That background may provide useful technical knowledge. It also makes disclosure and oversight important as New Jersey considers nuclear procurement, major new electricity demands and financing for energy infrastructure. The question is whether the public can be confident that BPU decisions are based on independent analysis of New Jersey’s interests rather than assumptions shaped by the industries and markets in which its leaders previously worked.

The same principle applies to Noll. Before joining the governor’s office, she worked as a senior policy adviser at Holland & Knight, a law and consulting firm that represents clients in the energy sector, including utilities and nuclear interests.

The Vogtle nuclear project in Georgia, built by Southern Company and its partners, illustrates the financial stakes of nuclear development. Its costs ballooned to $37 billion, with major consequences for customers, including a 25% rate increase. The experience is a warning about what can happen when construction costs spiral. It is not proof that every nuclear project will fail, but it is the kind of financial history an independent review should examine before New Jersey commits to a new buildout.

Then there is Madeline Urbish, who previously held senior government affairs positions at offshore wind developer Ørsted, including during the period when its Ocean Wind project involved a partnership with PSEG, before she became a senior energy adviser to the governor.

These backgrounds do not prove a conflict of interest, but they make transparency more important. The public deserves clear disclosures of relevant prior employment, clients and financial interests, along with decisions to recuse officials from matters involving former employers or clients. The state should also disclose relevant employment negotiations and enforce appropriate restrictions on officials who may move into positions with companies affected by their government decisions.

The concern extends beyond individual advisers. When the BPU, NJEDA, DEP, utilities, nuclear developers, and business representatives all help shape a program, the state must demonstrate that their responsibilities remain distinct. Agencies promoting a policy must not allow that role to compromise their regulatory duties.

The revolving door should not become a revolving credit line for corporate power.

Holtec’s seat at the table deserves public scrutiny

Holtec International is a particularly important case because it is both represented on the task force and a potential beneficiary of New Jersey’s nuclear expansion.

Holtec has proposed building four SMR-300 small modular reactors at the former Oyster Creek nuclear plant in Lacey Township. The company has targeted 2036 for the proposed reactors’ commercial operation and has discussed integrating AI data centers into the redevelopment.

That is a corporate proposal, not a guarantee that the reactors will be built, meet that schedule, or deliver affordable electricity. Small modular reactors currently cost an estimated $12 million to $14 million per megawatt, compared with roughly $1 million per megawatt for solar.

Holtec’s record also warrants scrutiny. In January 2024, the company agreed to pay a $5 million penalty to resolve a New Jersey investigation concerning alleged misrepresentations in a tax credit application. The matter arose from an investigation by the state’s Office of Public Integrity and Accountability.

None of this proves that Holtec’s task force representative will act improperly. But a company seeking to develop nuclear facilities has an obvious commercial interest in the rules, financing arrangements, permitting standards, and public policies governing those facilities.

Holtec should be able to provide information and answer questions. The company’s leadership should not enjoy privileged influence over decisions affecting its commercial prospects. The state should disclose how industry input is gathered, how recommendations are developed, and how potential conflicts are managed.

A company seeking public support for its projects should not help write the rules and then expect the public to assume the resulting deal is fair.

PSEG: Public subsidies, private profits

The same scrutiny must apply to PSEG, whose existing nuclear operations and potential future projects could benefit from the state’s new policy.

PSEG and the nuclear industry have a long history of public support, including about $3 billion associated with stranded assets during energy deregulation, about $2 billion in Zero Emission Certificates, and $3 billion associated with nuclear plant closure funds. The scale and terms of these programs deserve a transparent accounting, particularly when nuclear operators have continued to generate substantial revenues and profits.

The public must be able to see how much support the industry has received, what ratepayers got in return, and whether additional subsidies are necessary. New Jersey should not write another multibillion-dollar check without independently demonstrating the public benefit.

Another potential avenue for public exposure involves proposed nuclear development near Artificial Island in the Lower Delaware River, close to the site of the abandoned Hope Creek Unit 2 project. The earlier project was abandoned amid concerns about soaring costs. Land and infrastructure in the area have since been tied to plans for offshore wind port development through NJEDA.

The state paid about $104 million for the property, and roughly $550 million has been spent on infrastructure improvements, according to figures cited for the project. Those investments were associated with developing port infrastructure, not a new nuclear plant.

But because NJEDA owns the land, the public needs to know whether the property or infrastructure could be repurposed for nuclear development, and on what terms. The state must disclose whether infrastructure bonds, conduit financing, or other public financing mechanisms could support a nuclear project. It must also explain whether future revenues from Advanced Nuclear Energy Certificates could be used to repay billions in public financing and who would bear the risk if projected revenues fall short.

These questions go to the heart of whether public assets and financing could help a private utility or developer build a costly project while shifting financial risks to taxpayers and ratepayers.

The public deserves answers before commitments are made, not after the deals are signed and the bills arrive.

The Power NJ Act: A promise of protection is not proof

The administration argues that the Power NJ Act provides a competitive process and safeguards for ratepayers. Those provisions deserve examination, not dismissal. But their existence does not prove that nuclear expansion will lower electricity bills or eliminate financial risks.

The law directs the BPU and NJEDA to establish a procurement process for at least 1,100 megawatts of new nuclear generation. It provides for evaluating proposals, negotiating project terms, and issuing qualifying certificates that electricity suppliers would be required to purchase. The framework includes consideration of financing, project milestones, pricing, and ratepayer protections.

This is a significant state intervention in the energy market, designed to help make new nuclear projects viable. But a competitive procurement process is not necessarily a good deal for consumers. Competition among developers cannot make an uneconomic technology economic, and negotiated contracts do not automatically protect ratepayers from every risk.

The state must publish the assumptions behind its financial models, explain how proposed prices will be calculated, disclose how long consumers could be obligated to support qualifying projects, and show how costs will be allocated among residential customers, businesses, utilities, and large industrial electricity users.

It must also explain what happens if a project is delayed, canceled, underperforms or becomes more expensive than projected. Which costs will be borne by developers or investors? Which risks could still reach consumers through electricity markets, financing arrangements or other charges?

Federal financing requirements and limits on passing construction cost overruns to ratepayers may provide important protections, but the public needs to examine their precise terms, exceptions and enforcement mechanisms. Federal loan guarantees can shift some financial exposure to federal taxpayers; they do not make a project free.

New Jersey should not confuse a financing mechanism that makes a project attractive to investors with one that makes electricity affordable for the public. The state’s protections should be tested against real-world scenarios before it commits to a project.

Who will really benefit from new nuclear power?

The nuclear debate is increasingly tied to the enormous electricity demands of artificial intelligence and data centers. That raises a question the task force must answer: Is New Jersey planning new reactors primarily to benefit residents and businesses, or to help major corporations secure power for energy-intensive operations?

Holtec has discussed integrating AI data centers into its proposed Oyster Creek redevelopment. PSEG has also expressed interest in advanced nuclear development at existing sites and opportunities involving large electricity users. These proposals show that nuclear expansion is not simply about replacing old generation or lowering household bills. It is also about meeting growing industrial electricity demand.

Data centers can require enormous amounts of electricity and drive demand for additional generation, transmission infrastructure, substations, and grid upgrades. If costs are not allocated properly, residential customers can end up subsidizing infrastructure that primarily benefits private corporations.

The task force must examine how much new electricity will be needed, when it will be needed, and who will use it. It must compare corporate demand forecasts with independent projections and establish rules ensuring that large electricity users pay the full incremental costs they impose on the grid. It should also examine whether data centers could obtain power through direct arrangements with generators without shifting transmission, reliability, or backup costs onto other customers.

If the administration wants to claim that nuclear expansion will make electricity more affordable, it must demonstrate how the benefits will reach ordinary ratepayers. Adding supply does not automatically lower household costs, especially when new generation comes with enormous construction and financing expenses.

The most expensive way to boil water?

Nuclear power can produce large amounts of electricity with low operational carbon emissions. But that does not mean every nuclear project is affordable, necessary, or the best use of public resources.

New reactors require enormous upfront investments, complex licensing, specialized construction, security, fuel, waste management and eventual decommissioning. Small modular reactors are promoted as a way to make nuclear power more flexible and economical, but their projected costs and commercial performance must be demonstrated, not assumed.

The question is not whether nuclear power can generate electricity. New Jersey’s existing Salem and Hope Creek plants already demonstrate that it can. The question is whether building additional reactors is the most cost-effective and responsible way to meet future demand.

Solar, wind, battery storage, energy efficiency, demand management, and grid modernization also require investment and careful planning. They should not be treated as afterthoughts while the state develops a dedicated framework to advance nuclear power.

The administration should commission an independent comparison of the full costs, deployment schedules, reliability contributions, environmental impacts, and financial risks of every major option. It should examine combinations of technologies, not just isolated projects, and determine whether efficiency and storage investments could reduce the amount of new generation required.

New Jersey cannot afford to confuse technological ambition with sound economics. The most advanced technology in the world is a bad investment if it costs too much, arrives too late or fails to deliver the promised public benefits.

The waste problem didn’t disappear because the law changed

The administration’s April action to lift the de facto moratorium changed New Jersey’s approach to radioactive waste permitting. It allows the DEP commissioner to consider permits based on approved, compliant spent-fuel storage methods rather than requiring a permanent disposal solution that had previously been a major obstacle to new nuclear construction.

That change removes a major legal barrier. It does not solve the national problem of permanent radioactive waste disposal.

Spent nuclear fuel remains hazardous for very long periods and requires secure storage, monitoring, and maintenance. New reactors would add to the material that must be managed. The public deserves a clear accounting of the long-term costs, responsibilities and risks, including what happens if a permanent federal disposal solution remains unavailable.

Coastal facilities raise additional questions. Any proposed new reactors at Oyster Creek or other coastal sites must be evaluated for flooding, storm surge, sea-level rise, cooling water needs, emergency access, and the resilience of essential systems under future climate conditions.

New Jersey has already experienced the consequences of severe storms and flooding. Nuclear safety planning must account for a changing climate, not simply rely on historical conditions. The rush to expand electricity supply must not become an excuse for shortcuts in environmental review or emergency planning.

A spin campaign is not public participation

On Oct. 1, the administration launched Nuclear NJ, a website developed with the BPU, DEP and NJEDA to provide information about nuclear energy and the state’s plans. The task force also established a subcommittee focused on public trust and confidence.

Providing information is useful. But a government website explaining why an administration supports nuclear power is not the same as an independent review of whether its policy is justified.

Public engagement must go beyond explaining the administration’s position. Residents must be able to question underlying assumptions, scrutinize financial models, challenge proposed sites and influence decisions before they are made.

The public needs access to technical studies, procurement assumptions, consultant reports, financing proposals and meeting records, subject to applicable disclosure laws. The state should explain who prepared the studies, who paid for them, what alternatives were considered, and how disagreements among experts were resolved.

The task force must be willing to hear that a proposed project is too expensive, too risky or unnecessary. If its job is simply to build public confidence in a policy already decided, it is managing public relations rather than earning public trust.

New Jersey needs an independent energy policy, not a nuclear blank check

New Jersey has real energy challenges. Electricity bills are too high, the grid needs modernization, climate change is intensifying extreme weather, and data centers are creating new demands for power. Those challenges require a comprehensive energy strategy, not a rush to commit the state to expensive new reactors.

The Nuclear Power Task Force should be replaced or fundamentally restructured as an independent commission with balanced representation from consumer groups, environmental organizations, public-health and nuclear safety experts, energy economists, labor, utilities, and affected communities.

Its job must be to determine whether new nuclear generation is necessary, cost-effective and in the public interest, not simply how to make it happen. That review must compare nuclear power with renewables, storage, efficiency, demand management and grid upgrades while evaluating full life-cycle costs and environmental risks.

The state must also disclose relevant financial and professional relationships, establish clear conflict-of-interest and recusal rules, protect the independence of environmental regulators and ensure that corporate representatives do not exercise privileged influence over decisions affecting their commercial interests.

Large electricity users should not be allowed to shift the costs of their expansion onto ordinary families and small businesses. Public land, infrastructure, bonds and other financing mechanisms must not become backdoor subsidies for private nuclear projects without full disclosure and independent scrutiny.

The task force should not define success as getting reactors approved, clearing regulatory obstacles or finding ways to finance projects developers cannot otherwise justify. Success should mean delivering reliable, affordable electricity while protecting public health, the environment and the integrity of government.

The public has seen this movie before: Private interests promise economic benefits, government provides the financing and political cover, and ordinary people are left holding the bill when the numbers do not add up.

This is beginning to look less like independent energy planning and more like a carefully managed campaign to sell the public an expensive nuclear buildout. The danger is not just that New Jersey could end up with costly reactors. It is that the state could commit public resources, reshape its regulations and expose ratepayers to long-term risks before an independent process has established that the projects are necessary or worthwhile.

A task force stacked with the people responsible for advancing the policy is no substitute for independent scrutiny, and government by press release is no way to decide the energy future of our state.